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Abstract
Not all Europeans migrated to the United States. Between 1879 and 1930 13 million of
Europeans went to Latin America; however, Latin America is not fully incorporated
into current debates on the cost and benefits from Atlantic migration. This paper
surveys Latin America immigration experience since the late nineteenth century to
1930. It assesses inferences about European migrants in Latin America derived from the
experience of migrants in the United States and questions its validity. The topics
covered here include migration trends and chronology, national origin of the flows and
the evolution of real wages. New data on the cost of passages for transatlantic migration
is also presented. This is followed by an examination of the immigrants’ contribution to
economic growth in Latin America dealing basically with the issue of human capital
brought in by European immigrants. The extent to which immigrants alter the
composition of the labour force and the demographic structure, both in the short and the
long run is also examined. A final section concludes with some new avenues for future
research.
* I am grateful to Alejandro Vázquez and Bruce Sacerdote for their data on passage
fares. Roberto Cortés Conde and Carlos Marichal made many insightful comments
while Patrick K. O’Brien contributed with extremely useful suggestions. All remaining
errors are mine.
2The role of Latin America in the international economy has changed in many
ways since the late nineteenth century particularly in relation to the international labour
market. Around 1900, Latin America was an area of destination for millions of
immigrants, mainly Europeans. By the end of the twentieth century, Latin America had
experienced a “population explosion” and the region is no longer an area of
immigration. On the contrary, one of the main features of almost all Latin American
countries nowadays is the high volume of emigration to the United States and Europe.
This paper concentrates on the so called “age of mass migration”, 1870-1930,
and will attempt to bring Latin America histories of migration in the Atlantic economy,
a history still biased clearly in favour of the United States Immigration history has been
guilty of an “American bias” even though since the 1960s historians like Frank
Thistlethwaite (1960) and John D. Gould (1979, 1980) praised for a comparative
approach in immigration research. The revival of migration studies in the 1990s showed
and effort to integrate countries other than the US, Argentina being the case in point,
(Hatton and Williamson 1998) but the core of the analysis is still the American
experience.
Text books on economic growth in the long run or economic history in Latin
America concentrate on trade and capital and devote only a few pages to the
relationship of Latin American countries with the international labour markets.
Particularly British historians such as Platt or Ferns focused their research on trade and
capital since those were the basic links of the British economy with Latin America
during the modern period. Since the British were not a major immigrant groups in Latin
America, they hardly considered the role of foreign labour. For the colonial period the
preferential attention of social scientist is given to native populations and coerced
migration from Africa, and to a much lesser degree to free immigration. African slaves
were part of the world supply of labour force to Latin America. In terms of immigration
alone, America was an extension of Africa rather than Europe until late in the
nineteenth century.
Research on immigration in Latin America since the Industrial Revolution is a
comparatively neglected field constrained by a narrow conception of the “Atlantic
Economy” and some over-simplifications of the Latin experience during the age of mass
migration. The experiences of Latin American countries are not fully incorporated into
current debates on the cost and benefits from Atlantic migration despite the fact that 13
million of Europeans migrated to that region between 1870 and 1930 (a higher number
3than to Australia and Canada). Even the most favoured country by researchers,
Argentina, still lags behind research done for the United States, Australia and Canada.
This paper draws together, in the form of an analytical survey, a number of
different aspects of the Latin America immigration experience since the late nineteenth
century to 1930. Its main objective is to rethink the role of European migration to Latin
America and to clarify some over-simplifications of the Latin experience during the age
of mass migration.
Section I discusses to what extent Latin America mimics the experience of the
USA focusing on migration trends, national origins of immigrants, the evolution of real
wages and the costs of passage across the Atlantic. Did migrants contribute to growth is
the question addressed in section II by analysing how much human capital was brought
in by immigrants and how did they adjust to the labour market. Then, the extent to
which immigrants alter the composition of the labour force and the demographic
structure, both in the short and the long run is examined in section III. As a conclusion,
the paper includes some new avenues for future research.
Section I. The international labour market: why immigration into Latin
America lagged behind the United States?
Improvements in transport and communication over the nineteenth century and
the progressive elimination of institutional barriers to commerce induced an impressive
increase in commodity and factor mobility. About 60 million Europeans migrated to
economies of the New World characterized by scarcities of capital and labour and by
cheap and abundant land. Not all countries in Latin America suffered from labour
scarcity. Mexico had a relatively large native population and Brazil had both a large
slave and free labour force. Resource abundance with labour scarcity certainly
characterized the River Plate area and the Brazilian hinterland. Nevertheless, almost all
Latin American governments tried to attract foreign labour to prevent labour shortages
in specific sectors of the national economies and some governments thought that
immigration of culturally “superior” Europeans could contribute to economic and social
modernization.
Ferenczi and Willcox, (1929, 1931) document the main trends in international
migration and show that the majority of European immigrants went to the United States.
4Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century Latin America remained marginal to
international market in free labour1. Political instability in several new Republics; the
low demand for free labour in the majority of Latin American countries who possessed
either large native populations (Mexico) or used slaves (Brazil and Cuba); the high cost
of the passage; unfavourable geographies and climates in the hinterland; unattractive
political and cultural characteristics; all help to explain why Latin America lagged well
behind the United States as a destination for immigrants.
After 1870 the situation changed. Political stability and the emergence of
policies design to attract foreign immigrants that had been growing since the 1850s and
1860s including religious freedom, rights of private ownership and respect for civil
rights, friendlier attitudes towards foreigners, all helped. The story is well known:
exports rose, capital flows from Europe came on stream and investment in railways
altered prospects for the exploitation of the regions abundant in natural resources
(Bethell 1986, Bulmer-Thomas 1994).
Argentina, Brazil after the abolition of slavery, Uruguay and Cuba were the
main destination for foreign labour. More than 90 percent of the 13 million European
immigrants who travelled to Latin America between 1870 and 1930 chose these four
countries although modest immigration flows to countries such as Chile, Venezuela or
Mexico occurred. Others like Paraguay or Peru failed almost completely to attract
European immigrants.
Gross figures differ considerably from net immigration supposedly because one
of the main features of European immigration to Latin America was an exceptional rate
of return migration (Gould 1980). Sánchez-Albornoz (1986) estimates that between
1892 and 1930 only 46 percent of immigrants remained permanently in the state of Sao
Paulo and the same rate is found in Cuba (47 percent) between 1902 and 1930. For
Argentina it has been calculated that the rate of return was around 53 percent (Rechini
de Lattes and Lattes 1975). But return migration increased all over the world from the
1880s onwards. For example an increasing fraction of those who migrated to the United
States after 1890 never intended to remain permanently and returned to their home
country. Temporary movements in search of higher wages often over long distances and
across frontiers, was an established tradition in many of the regions from which the
“new” immigrants were drawn.
Net immigration in Argentina over the period 1881-1930 reached 3.8 million.
Uruguay attracted nearly 600,000 immigrants during the same period. More or less the
5same number remained in Cuba between 1902 and 1930. Whereas 200,000 people went
to Chile only 25,000 immigrants entered Paraguay and Mexico received less than
18,000 net immigrants between 1911 and 1924 (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929). The
ability of Argentina to attract large numbers of immigrants relative to its own
population is striking not only in the American context but compares favourably with
Australia and Canada. In 1910-14 foreigners represented 14.5% of total population in
the United States but around 30% of the total population in Argentina. Prima facie,
immigrants could have been more significant for the development of Argentina than the
United States particularly regarding the impact of immigrants upon the receiving
country.
European sources of emigration changed over time. In the central decades of the
nineteenth century dominant migratory streams came from the British Isles, Germany
and the Scandinavian countries. Southern and Eastern Europeans followed in the 1880s
(Gould 1979). An “emigration life cycle” related to demographic transition,
industrialization and the “pulls” of a growing stock of previous migrants abroad
developed has been well documented (Hatton and Williamson 1998, chap.3). Southern
and Eastern European countries entered into the upswing of their emigration cycle in
decades prior to World War One.
The question of timing is crucial in the new perspective of analysis and
comparisons presented here. Latin America was a latecomer to the age of mass
migration. Yet, immigrants did not arrive in a vacuum and the experience of pioneers
and early networks conditioned the assimilation and performance of the followers.
When mass European immigration into Latin America started to flow in the 1880s, it
was clear that the region could not compete with the United States. Hardly any country
of immigration could compete with the extraordinary attraction of the United States.
Over the nineteenth century the United States absolutely dominated the European flow.
Europeans from these so called “new emigration countries” had a wider array of
options open to them than those who crossed the Atlantic in the middle of the nineteenth
century. They could, and many did, opt for the United States, Canada and Australia but
Latin American countries made efforts around these decades to attract European
immigrants as voyages by sea became shorter, safer and cheaper. The significance of
the transport revolution can not be neglected for some countries in Latin America. The
average time taken to travel from Northern Spain to Cuba in the 1850s was 38 days by
sailing vessels; that had decreased to around 19 days in the 1880s and the steamers
6could do the trip in about 9 to 12 days. On the River Plate route steamers cut the trip
from around 55 days in the mid nineteenth century to 12 days in the 1910s (Moya 1998
and Vázquez, 1999). This dramatic reduction in the duration of the Atlantic crossing
effectively reduced the cost of migration when the opportunity cost of the earning time
wasted on board ship is added to the monetary cost of the trip which was particularly
important for the temporary migrants and contributed decisively to increase the number
of workers travelling to and from the Americas in search of higher wages.
Unfortunately, long-term annual series for transatlantic passage fares are not
available for many European countries, particularly for Southern Europe.
Table 1 presents some useful data on fares for Spanish emigrants to their three
main destinations and includes (for comparison) fares paid by British emigrant en route
to the United States (Vázquez 1999; Sacerdotre 1995)2. A falling trend for fares to
Brazil, Argentina and Cuba is observed from the 1850s onwards. The cheapest fares
from Spain were for voyages to Cuba but remained quite stable over time3. More
expensive fares to Brazil and Argentina in the 1870s and 1880s experienced sharp
declines in the years of massive emigration. According to Cortés Conde, in the 1880’s
an Italian worker could finance his transatlantic trip with only 20 percent of his income
but Spanish emigrants had to pay for the cost of a passage from incomes of a lower
level. For an agricultural worker from the north of Spain the cost of the trip in the 1880s
(expressed in the number of working days required to pay the fare) was around 153
working days from a working year of, at most, 250 days but remittances and pre-paid
tickets sent home by previous generations of migrants helped to finance the moves of
relatives and friends (Cortes Conde 1979; Sánchez-Alonso 2000a). The same situation
pertained in Italy and Portugal which explains the massive emigration over the first
decade of the twentieth century. Table 2 also documents a convergence between
Spanish and British fares: in the first decade of the twentieth century, a period of
massive emigration from Spain, when fares to Latin America moved to levels quite
similar to those from Britain to the United States. Fares from Spanish ports to the
United States in the years 1911-1914 cost $40 compared to $38 to Brazil, $33 to
Argentina and $39 to Cuba (Vázquez 1999). British emigrants paid $34 to travel to the
United States in the same years. Regression analysis suggests that the roles of migratory
networks, the diffusion of information (or the lack of it for the United States), culture,
language and the existence of long standing colonial links in the case of Cuba explains
7to a larger extent the Spaniards’ preference for Latin American countries than the cost
of the travel (Sánchez-Alonso 2000b).
Table 1
Transatlantic Passage Fares, 1850-1914
(in current $)
Spain-Brazil Spain-Argentina Spain-Cuba Britain-USA
1850-1860 n.a 45.18 33.32 44ª
1870-1880* 50.71 52.30 36.70 26.55
1881-1890** 45.54 46.60 32.10 20.40
1904-1914*** 31.20 35.19 34.21 33
Sources and notes: Spanish data refer to passages from Galician ports. Vázquez González, (1999).
Britain-USA data refer to passages from Liverpool to New York. Sacerdote (1995)
* For Latin American countries, 1872-1880
** For Spain-Cuba, 1881-1886
*** For Spain-Brazil, 1906-1914; for Britain-USA, 1904-1912
ª Fares were exceptionally high for the years 1850-1851. Average fare for 1852-1862 were $ 36.9
Latin America derived most of its immigrants mainly from Southern Europe,
although there was also a considerable flow from Central as well as from East and
Southeast European countries in the years prior to the Great War4. All of these European
regions of departure were countries of emigration to the United States.
The new and massive waves of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe,
who joined the movement since the 1880s were different from those who crossed the
Atlantic in the earlier cycles. The traditional representation in the history of the
European migration is that of migrants travelling with families in the mid-nineteenth
century (particularly to the United States) while workers from the “new emigration”
countries were travelling alone. Three-quarters of the English and welsh, two thirds of
the Dutch and two-thirds of the Germans who migrated to the United States in the 1830s
were in family groups and a third of them were children under 15 (Erickson 1994). In
contrast, since migrants to Latin America were drawn from these “new emigration”
countries in Europe, they were supposed to travel alone in high numbers. A large
number of immigrants did so but many came in family units with dependants children.
Cuban demands for labour pulled in more male immigrants travelling alone than Brazil
which attracted relatively more families with children than other countries. Family
groups’ migrating also to Argentina was surprisingly high. In 1895, 48 percent of
8migrants to Argentina arrived as families, a share that fell to 41 percent of total
immigration in 1913. Some of these families (especially among the Italians) were
dominated by persons of working age (for example a father and three or four sons) and
some nationalities display stronger tendencies to migrate as families. For example, since
1900 around 40 percent of Spanish immigrants to Argentina came as families. Among
the Italians family groups were more significant in the nineteenth century and less so in
the years before the War. Spanish families tended moreover to be larger than the Italian
families (3.2 members per Spanish family in 1913 compared to 2.8 of the Italians and 3
for total immigration (Sánchez-Alonso 1992). Only 18 percent of Spanish immigrants to
Sao Paulo arrived without family in 1908-1936 compared to 53 percent of Portuguese
arrivals over the same period (Klein 1996). The number of migrant children (32 percent
of the flow) was also higher among Spanish families in Brazil than other nationalities
(Portuguese migrant children were 19 percent). Parts of the explanation for these
variations in migratory strategies arise because information about different labour
markets improved over time. Spanish families opted for Brazil and Argentina while
individual migrants preferred Cuba where demand for young males was stronger.
The traditional view also stress that high proportions of the “new immigrants”
were illiterates and as common labourers entered into unskilled urban occupations
rather than agriculture (see section II). They returned home in high numbers both from
all the American destinations. Thus there are no clear differences between late
nineteenth century European emigrants going to the US than those who opted for Latin
American countries. What is different in Latin America is the absence of those
migratory flows from Northern Europe that took place before 1880s.
Why Europeans went to Latin America? Economists have assumed that wage
differentials between home and destination countries explain migration. Research done
by Williamson (1999) allows us to document levels and movements in annual real
wages for a large number of countries in the world from 1870 onwards. His data
suggests that during the years of massive emigration from Europe Latin American
countries could not compete for labour by offering wages at levels offered in the United
States. Within Latin America hardly any country could compete with the River Plate.
Argentina and Uruguay display the highest wage levels up to 1914 and migrants flowed
in higher numbers into Argentina than into Brazil, Cuba or Uruguay. Wages in
Argentina and Uruguay were systematically more than 200 percent higher compared to
a weighted average of wages of Italy, Portugal and Spain (Table 2 and Figure 1). They
9were over 160 higher in Cuba in the years prior to the Great War, and were also much
higher in Mexico. Mexico never experienced mass immigration from Europe.
Brazil, however, represents a puzzle for the traditional explanation of migration
based solely on real wage gaps: wages in Brazil were only 50 percent higher than
average wage levels in the Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, Brazil had to compete
for labour with Argentina and Cuba. Subsidies and contract labour in the coffee sector
allowed Brazil to compete for foreign workers. Subsidized immigration allowed
potential emigrants to Brazil to overcome the problems involved in funding long
distance migration. Research has shown that Spanish emigration was constrained by
low levels of income (2000b). In 1911 more than 70 per cent of Spanish immigrants to
Sao Paulo arrived with a subsidized passage compared to a mere 24 per cent of
Portuguese who had stronger links with Brazil (Klein 1996). Furthermore real
advantages of the colono contract also explain the attraction of Brazil. Coffee workers
paid no rent, either in money, products or labour in return for some non-monetary
provisions, generalizations about the colono’s real wages are difficult to make. Food
and rent are always an important part of a worker’s budget and Holloway (1980)
estimates that perhaps 70 percent of a colono family’s total income came in the form of
free housing, food crops or pasture lands. The system included the security of a
minimum annual income, low expenses and consequently the possibility of
accumulating savings through free housing and cheap food and finally the possibility of
maximizing family income by fully using the labour of all members of the family. Thus,
the wage gap is quite irrelevant as an indicator of Brazilian attraction of immigrant
families.
Table 2
Real Wage Performance by Decade relative to the Mediterranean Countries
(Weighted average of Italy, Portugal and Spain)
Argentina Brazil SE Brazil NE Colombia Cuba Mexico Uruguay
1850s 35.8
1870s 207.7 48.9 15.5 53.1
1890s 267.8 47.5 10.1 79.1 173.2 324.8
1909-1913 212.1 47.8 16.8 53.1 160.5 140.9 211.5
1930s 201.1 94.4 152.2 63 187
Sources: Williamson (1999)
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The Brazilian system of subsidizing immigration from Europe is also at odds
with the existence of a large native population. The native Brazilian population might
well have benefited from a reduction in the supply of unskilled labour from overseas but
apparently coffee planters located in the South East of this vast country preferred to
subsidize immigration from overseas instead of hiring native workers from low wage
areas of Northeast Brazil. Perhaps it was cheaper to pay for transport subsidies for
Europeans to cross the Atlantic? Yet it seems unlikely that transportation cost of
bringing workers from the Northeast to the Southeast of the country exceeded the cost
of transporting workers from Southern Europe to Brazil. Planters had after all done that
for two decades after 1850 when slaves where shipped from the less remunerative sugar
zones of north eastern regions to Santos and Rio de Janeiro. According to Klein (1999)
high transport costs, increasingly severe export taxes and other provincial government
restrictions seem to have curtailed seriously this internal slave trade by the late 1870s
and early 1880s. It might be the case that this experience led planters to reject the idea
of bringing native workers from the Northeast to meet expanding demands for
agricultural workers in the coffee regions.
Native workers from the North were certainly not immobile. Between 1872 and
1910 hundreds of thousands of workers from the Northeast migrated to the Amazon
region (Holloway 1980). From 1914 through 1929 a quarter of a million native internal
migrants passed through the labour system regulated by the Sao Paulo government and
many others entered the region without official assistance. For some reason, planters
preferred European immigrants to the peasant mulatto families from Northeast Brazil.
Leff (1982) suggested racial prejudices against native mulattos, but that seems difficult
to test and there is no evidence that planters in Brazil wished to develop their country on
the basis of white European immigrants (to keep pace with Argentina). On the contrary,
a large group of planters tried, unsuccessfully, to develop a mass immigration
recruitment program from China on the eve of slavery abolition (Conrad 1975). The
Brazilian government finally turned to Japan for a source of Asian workers in the early
decades of the twentieth century.
The huge wage gap between sending regions in Southern Europe and Latin
American economies has led scholars to argue that the latter enjoyed the advantages
associated by Arthur Lewis (1978) and others with an unlimited supply of labour.
Cortés Conde (1979) and Diaz Alejandro (1970) also argued that without European
immigration the supply of labour to the Argentinean labour market would have became
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highly inelastic and constricting for growth. Leff (1982) observed that the coffee
planters in Sao Paulo benefited from two streams of cheap labour: first from slaves and
thereafter from an inflow of subsidized immigrants. Immigrant workers from Europe
enabled Brazilian planters to maintain wages at low levels. Output and employment in
the export sector of the economy expanded over the long cycle 1880-1914 at constant
real wages in the coffee plantations.
The Lewis hypothesis concerning the elastic supply of labour from the
Mediterranean countries has been put to the test recently. Hatton and Williamson (1994)
econometric tests show that while wage gaps between Southern Europe and Latin
certainly influenced emigration, the elasticities are relatively small. In all three cases
(Italy, Spain and Portugal) a 10 per cent increase in the wage ratio raised emigration by
less than one per thousand in the long run compared with Britain and Ireland where long
run responses of 2.2 and 2.3 per thousand are observed. Their results lend little support
to the prevalent view in the literature that the supply of labour from Southern Europe
was highly elastic. The wage gaps may have been large but the elasticities of response
seem to have been seriously constrained by high migration costs for low wage workers
in Southern Europe. However, more detailed research has shown that emigration was
indeed income constrained in Spain and Italy (Sánchez-Alonso 2000b and Faini and
Venturini 1994). The unlimited supply of labour hypothesis still waits for a careful
research particularly for Brazil which is the more challenging case to test.
Immigrants to Latin America came from latecomer countries to emigration from
Europe and were in several respects different from those who crossed the Atlantic in the
early phases of the movement. They were not, however, different from those Europeans
who opted for the United States in the same period. On balance, the consensus is that
Latin America received poorer and potentially less productive immigrants than the
United States simply because the dominant stream emigrating from Europe over the
years 1880-1914 came from the economically backward areas of Southern and Eastern
Europe. However, these “new migrants” arrived also to the United States in huge
numbers. What is missing in the Latin American case is the Northern European flows
but is it a question of national origins or of different timing of arrival and to different
receiving societies? If national origins were roughly the same for immigrants going to
North and South America since the late nineteenth century, why then immigrants to
Latin America are often represented as poor and backwards?
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Section II. Did immigration contribute to economic growth in Latin
America?
Among scholars the consensus of opinion reached in the United States was that
the mass immigration of Europeans had, on the whole, profound positive effects on the
rate of growth of the American economy and on the welfare of resident workers (Carter
and Sutch 1997). Why such a consensus does not exist in the case of Latin America? Is
it because of the lower number of European immigrants in the region or because it is
assumed that the overall impact was not so positive? Or is it because we are transferring
economic realities of the second half of the twentieth century to the past?
Comparisons with the United States raise the issue of comparable units. There is
a long intellectual and scholarly tradition on the exceptionalism of the United States
since colonial times until nowadays. Exceptional does not mean different.
Exceptionalism projects onto a nation qualities that are envied because they represent
deliverance from a common lot. But the concept was created in Europe after American
Independence and then it was taken over by the American people. From the beginning
the concept had simultaneously clear contradictions and indisputable historical realities.
Among the formers the most obvious concerns the existence of slavery till the 1860s. In
the early images of America in early nineteenth century Europe, “there is no hint of the
daily, perfunctory brutality of a slave institution” (Appleby 1992). By the end of the
colonial period about one out of every five Americans was black and most of them were
slaves. Only half of the colonist had English roots and there were sizeable minorities
from Germany, Ireland and Scotland (Wells 1992). Members of the Dillingham
Commission writing in 1907 and praising “Old Immigrants” in comparisons with “New
Immigrants” from Southern and Eastern Europe never mentioned that Benjamin
Franklin deplored the arrival of Germans in Pennsylvania because they were “generally
the most stupid of their own nation” (Quoted in Schlesinger 1921).
The exceptionalism of the United States for the history of immigration merits
discussion particularly drawing the limits of comparisons with Latin American
countries. The United States is different since the colonial era particularly regarding the
obvious fact that Spanish America had a large native population. Since the Native
Americans have never been a potent factor in the nation’s history, the whole history of
population in the United States is, at bottom, the story of the successive waves of
immigration (basically from Europe) and of the adaptation of the new comers. Nothing
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of the sort happened in Latin America even in those countries that during the age of
mass migration were preferred destination for European workers. Native population and
African slaves were a basic element in the history of Latin America. The contrast
between a densely populated Europe and the empty lands in America (a powerful image
for potential emigrants) was not possible between Europe and the majority of countries
in Latin America.
Exceptionalism is also a concept that applies to the extraordinary economic
growth of the US after Independence. The United States doubled Latin America’s
product per head in 1820 and trebled it in 1870. Income gap grew still more since the
late nineteenth century (Prados de la Escosura 2004). In addition, focusing on the
contrast with North America inevitably leads to a negative assessment of Latin
America’s economic behaviour. Per capita income divergence between rich (core) and
poor (periphery) countries is the dominant feature of the international economy in the
nineteenth century. All countries lagged behind the United States during the period
1850-1930.
Immigration countries in Latin America differ from the United States experience
in the comparatively limited number of ethnic groups from whom the emigrants were
drawn. Such a concentration of culturally homogeneous immigrant groups present and
interesting contrast with the situation in the United States. Immigrants in Latin America
(mainly from Southern Europe) are usually represented as poor, backward and
illiterate5. This “representation” derives from comparisons of the economic
backwardness of Italy, Spain and Portugal (measured in terms of per capita incomes)
relative to Great Britain and other advanced countries in Europe. But were Italian
immigrants themselves poorer than Swedish or Irish immigrants? Were Northern
Italians, migrating to Argentina in the 1880s, more backward than the Irish migrants
travelling to USA in the 1860s? Their relative economic qualities will be explored by
analysing their occupation and literacy rates and their potential contribution to
economic development in Latin America.
As usual, these immigrants to Latin America were typically young adults who
carried very high labour participation rates to the receiving countries. For them (singles,
unskilled, young adults) the potential benefits from migrate would be greater than they
would be for the population at large, particularly if they embodied lower levels of
country-specific human capital (Hatton and Williamson 1998). How much did it matter
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to have specific human capital in Latin America? If the labour demand was basically of
unskilled labour, why being unskilled was a negative feature of the immigrants’ supply?
Immigration statistics in receiving countries record the occupation of immigrants
in broad generic terms but immigrants often declared an occupation that they believed
might be welcomed by a host country. For example, in Cuba the strong pull from the
sugar sector explains why 80 to 90 percent of immigrants in the first decade of the
twentieth century declared themselves to be hired hands or agricultural workers (Losada
1999).
The broad picture which emerges from aggregate statistics is one of a flow
composed overwhelmingly of unskilled rural labour. Even in Argentina, the most
diversified of the host economies, the majority of arrivals were agricultural workers and
day labourers (jornaleros). Furthermore, the low economic quality of immigrants has
been a common feature of almost all accounts of Brazilian immigration. Immigrants
arrived in Sao Paulo with the help from subsidized passages and it is assumed that
people who went to Brazil were from the lowest economic status of the groups
migrating to the New World. It has even been argued that subsidized travel aimed to
attract workers so destitute that they could have no choice but to work on the
plantations. Thus, Brazil obtained “the poorest of the poor” (Merrick and Graham
1979). However, the fact that emigrants to Brazil from either Portugal, Spain or Italy
came from the relatively less backward areas of the north of those countries and not
from the poorer south where masses of agricultural day labourers were allegedly living
in miserable conditions casts doubts on the expression “the poorest of the poor”. It
could also be argued that subsidies were a response to the wealth constraint on long
distance migration for large segments of the population in Southern Europe. This is the
argument applied to the indentured servants’ contracts to British colonial America or to
the convict workers transported to Australia in the early nineteenth century (Grubb 2003
and Nicholas 1988). However, these coerced migrants are not represented in the
literature as ignorant and backward. In the nineteenth century Australia had an assisted
migration program, more or less generous according to economic conditions at home:
50 percent of arrivals in the 1870s were assisted but only 10 percent in the crisis years
of the 1890s. Governments in remote countries had little choice but to subsidize the cost
of the passage if they wanted to attract immigrants but that does not imply that assisted
migrants were, by definition, illiterate and backward.
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Furthermore, in analyzing the characteristics of migrants distinctions between
sectors such as agriculture, commerce or industry may be analytically rather
meaningless and for two main reasons. First, in their countries of origin the majority of
Europeans active populations were employed in agriculture. In 1911, 60 percent of the
male labour force in Italy was still engaged in the primary sector and the majority of
unskilled labour, no matter what their designation in the statistics, in fact lived in rural
areas. Higher percentages of employment in agriculture and lower rates of urbanization
are found in Spain, Portugal and other countries of origin of immigrants to Latin
America. It would have been surprising that European emigrants to Latin America from
Southern and Eastern Europe included lower percentages of agricultural workers than
the populations of their countries of origin. Second, since immigrants often change
country and occupation at the same time, especially when they are young, it is not clear
whether the occupational information of immigrants on arrival is a useful indicator of
their subsequent contribution to economic growth. Thus, there are two separable
questions: (i) what did an immigrant bring from home? and (ii) what did he/she acquire
in the Americas? In spite of that, Hatton and Williamson (2005) stress that the
increasing importance of less industrial Eastern and Southern Europe as an emigrant
source served to raise the immigrant proportions rural and to lower their average skills
and literacy. Is the later an accurate picture of immigrants to Latin America?
Censuses provide with some picture of the adjustment of immigrants to host
labour markets. Not all Latin American censuses register population by nationality or
country of origin and usually it is impossible to obtain information either on second
generation immigrants, to distinguish permanent from temporary immigrants and on
their length of stay in the country. Length of stay provides crucial information for any
analysis of social mobility. For example, Spanish families resident in the city of Buenos
Aires in 1895 worked in low wage occupations but they had been there less than 5 years
and a majority had arrived in the late 1880’s when the Argentinean government paid for
the travel expenses (Sánchez-Alonso 1992). Given time immigrants acquired skills and
took advantage of local labour markets6.
Population censuses suggest that immigration to Latin America contributed
decisively to the urban labour force formation in commerce, industry, building,
domestic service and general unskilled labour force. In some countries, some
immigrants were successful in becoming owners of industries or commercial
enterprises. Even if the goal of many immigrants had been to work on the land, post hoc
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and for a majority migration turned out to be a large range transatlantic move from rural
to urban occupations. The highest concentration of immigrants in urban population was
found in the River Plate countries. Immigration contributed significantly to urbanization
in Latin America (Bourdé 1974, Scobie 1986). In 1910 countries attracting immigrants
also had the highest percentages of their population living in towns with 20,000 or more
inhabitants: Argentina 28 percent, Uruguay 30 and Cuba 28 percent, compared to the 10
percent ratio for Mexico. Exceptions to this trend included Brazil with a low rate of
urbanization (12 percent) and Chile with a high urbanization rate (23 percent) although
immigration was lower than in Brazil. In Southern cone countries rates of urbanization
were actually higher than rates for the countries of immigrants and similar to the United
States (31 percent) (Flora 1973: Mitchell 1993)7
Some historians explain the concentration of immigrants in urban activities in
Latin America as the outcome of land settlement policies controlled and restricted by a
native wealthy oligarchy in sharp contrast with what happened in the United States
(Engerman and Sokoloff 2005; Solberg 1987, among others). This stereotype can be
rejected and clarified for some countries. For example, Argentina had an open market in
land and many more immigrants than is generally believed became farmers (Miguez
1993, Taylor 1997, Adelman 1994). On the Pampas immigrants (particularly Italians)
opted to remain as tenants or share-croppers – a rational choice given their lack of
capital and knowledge of a new environment and cultivation system (Gallo (1983). Both
the time of arrival and the existence of colonial links help to account for differential
access to the land. Italians were the most successful in acquiring land in Argentina
because they were the pioneer group in the era of mass migration. In the 1880s the
proportion of Italian arrivals compared to Spaniards were 14 to 1. When massive
Spanish immigration to the country reached its peak in the years prior to the Great War
Argentina was already more urban than the country had been in the 1880s and there
were more opportunities to maximize the wage differentials working in the cities than in
agriculture (or seasonally in the two sectors).
The colonial links of Portuguese settlers with Brazil and Spaniards with Cuba till
1898, explain why immigrants concentrated in the urban and commercial cities like Rio
de Janeiro or Havana and not in the rural sector8. Linguistic advantages and established
connections with local commercial networks reinforced such trends. Although Spanish
immigrants in Mexico barely reached 0.2 percent of Mexican population in 1910, their
influence in the creation of Mexican industries, business and commercial enterprises has
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led Mexican historians to define this minority as “privileged immigrants (Lida 1994).
During the Porfiriato Spaniards belonged to the upper middle class in the main cities of
the country. By 1930 only 3 percent of the Spaniards living in Mexico were engaged in
agriculture but were decidedly influential in the Mexican business sector.
Southern European immigrants to Latin American countries were generally
over-represented in commercial activities in urban centres. Given high rates of return
migration and considering that a high proportion of migrants never intended to settle
permanently in the receiving country, what low representation among landowners might
imply? Research shows that the main goal of emigrants from Southern Europe was
indeed to buy land but in countries of origin (Cinel 1991, Costa Leite 1993).
The representation of immigrants to Latin America as “low quality” labour
comes from comparisons carried out within the United States labour market that
contrast “old” immigrants coming from Northern Europe and “new” immigrants from
Southern and Eastern European countries. But that representation does not pertain to
comparisons between Italians in Argentina and in the United States. Italian integration
and mobility in the two societies differed markedly. The United States received a larger
group of unskilled and illiterate day labourers from the South of Italy while Argentina
received the more qualified and literate immigrants from the North. Italians who chose
Buenos Aires as their destination generally achieved greater economic and social
success than those who went to New York (Baily 1999; Klein 1983).
Literacy has been frequently used as an indicator of the low quality of the
immigrants in Latin America (Cipolla 1969). Since literacy rates were lower in sending
countries than for Northern European immigrants to the United States, particularly
Scandinavia, the general view that emerges from the comparison with Australia, Canada
and the United States is of a relatively illiterate migratory flow to Latin America. This
picture is broadly the case but needs to be qualified.
Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the United States showed the
same low rates of literacy than those who migrated to Latin America (or even lower like
the Southern Italians case). Argentinean statistics show that 40 percent of immigrants
arriving in the peak years, 1880-1886 were illiterate. In 1914, a year of massive arrivals,
the percentage had slightly increased to 42 whereas after the Great War it was much
lower (18 percent). In the United States, 38 per cent of Southern and Eastern European
immigrants arriving between 1899 and 1910 were illiterate, a percentage not very
different than in Argentina9. Since Argentina received masses of immigrants it might be
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assumed that their literacy level was lower than more selective flows. However, the
most diversified and urban economy of Argentina might a priori have attracted more
literate immigrants than other Latin American countries. The latter seems not to be the
case. Only 34 percent of immigrants older than 7 who arrived to the port of Santos in
Brazil between 1908 and 1936 were illiterate. In the 1920s the percentage of illiterates
for the native born population of Sao Paulo State were 73 per cent (Klein 1996)
Literate Spanish immigrants were to be found in Cuba before 1898 because of
the colonial status of the island. But Cuba continued to attract literate Spaniards even
after Independence. Thus the proportion of literate Spanish immigrants arriving on the
island ranged from 63 percent in 1912 to 94 in 1924 (Losada 1999). Even with a high
demand for unskilled labour on the sugar plantations the percentage of literates among
Spanish immigrants increased10.
According to Argentinean population census only 26 percent of Spaniards over
the age of seven living in Argentina were illiterate in 1914 compared to 50 percent of
the total Spanish population in 1910. Illiteracy rates in Italy were 38 percent in 1911, a
percentage similar to that of the Italians living in Argentina. In Portugal nearly 70
percent of population was illiterate in 1910 compared with only 52 percent of
Portuguese immigrants to Sao Paulo.
Table 3 presents a different picture of literacy rates for Italian and Spanish
immigrants in Argentina before 1895. Data refers to a random sample from the original
census of immigrants residents in Argentina in the census year. Significant differences
are observed between rural and urban immigrants and in both cases between men and
women. The overall picture is, for the two nationalities, one of extraordinary high
literacy rates, particularly for Spanish male immigrants; these rates are certainly much
higher than the populations of origin and also higher than those reported for Southern
Europeans immigrants to the United States by O’Rourke and Williamson (1997).
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Table 3
Argentina 1895. Literacy Rates (%)
Population older than 7 years old
A) Italians
Urban Rural
Males Females Males Females
77.95 66.51 66.96 56.44
Total 100 Total 100 Total 100 Total 100
n=3202 n=2010 n=775 n=388
B) Spaniards
Urban Rural
Males Females Males Females
87.85 68.65 76.96 56.44
Total 100 Total 100 Total 100 Total 100
n=2380 n=1340 n=465 n=235
Sources: Archivo General de la Nación. Population Census 1895. Archival files num. 466 to 584 and 800
to 1041.
The issue is whether the proportion of immigrants possessing some levels of
literacy was higher than those who remained at home, that is, if migrants were
positively selected. Given the selectivity of migrants by age distribution and given the
concentration of Southern Europeans emigrants from few regions, the comparison of
immigrants’ literacy rates with overall rates of residents is inadequate. In the three main
European countries of origin, the northern regions from where the majority of
immigrants were drawn tended to be more literate than other parts of the country,
particularly in the Italian case. But in Italy the selectivity of the transatlantic migratory
flow seems to have been lower than in other countries: the larger the migratory flow the
closer the typical emigrant would be to the average population of origin. When
immigrant’s literacy is compared to literacy rates of potential emigrants from regions of
high emigration the selectivity of the process appears quite clear for Spain and Portugal
(Sánchez Alonso 1995; Costa Leite 1993). The evidence suggests that Southern Europe
lost human capital to Latin America.
Another relevant issue is whether immigrants contributed to raise literacy levels
in Latin America. The literacy levels of immigrants can be compared to those of native
populations in Latin American receiving countries. Not all governments made the same
effort to raise levels of education, but the data show that those countries with the
smallest native populations around 1850 and the largest inflows of European
immigrants displayed the lowest illiteracy rates around 1910 (Flora 1973). Latin
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American rankings are led by Uruguay (25 percent of illiterates in 1908). Uruguay was
the country with the highest rate of immigration compared to native population.
Argentina had 38 percent of illiterates whereas Chile, with much lower immigration
rates than the River Plate region, had a 50 percent of illiteracy rate in the 1910s.
Mexico’s illiteracy rate was 72 percent of the population, higher than Brazil and Cuba
with high proportions of population of African origin. These rates are certainly low
compared to literacy rates for the same period for the United States, Canada and
Australia. Immigrants raised literacy levels in some Latin American countries but other
forces mattered more, particularly political commitment and taxes allocated to improve
educational levels among their populations.
Did immigration add special skills or entrepreneurial capacities to the local
labour force? Immigrants seem to have been over-represented among proprietors of
industrial and commercial firms. They also contributed importantly to the formation of
industrial and urban workforces. Immigrants in Argentina and Brazil accounted for
disproportionately large shares of the workers in Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires
manufacturing industries. Argentinean historians find immigrants played a positive role.
Germani (1955) was among many historians to stress the modernizing role of
immigrants and their exceptional contribution to the development of an entrepreneurial
class in Argentina. But, according to Landes (1998: p. 321) Argentina selected
underemployed peasants of little skills and education whose potential contribution to the
economy was limited. For Brazil, Dean (1969) has argued that in the Southeast
immigrants and their children played an important role as entrepreneurs in the
industrialization in Sao Paulo and for the modernization of the rural sector. Leff (1997)
disagrees and argues that immigration was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
to promote development. Leff believes that if overseas immigrants had not been
available, that supply of labour to fill the growing demand of industrial workers in Sao
Paulo could have come from domestic sources. This is, however, a very difficult
counterfactual to test. On the whole European workers retained a good reputation as
workers both in the agricultural and the industrial labour forces. All reports from Brazil,
Argentina, and Cuba concerning the productivity of Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese
immigrants stress the fact that they were hard-working, sober and well-behaved. In
contrast, the United States Immigration Commission concluded in 1911 that the “new”
immigrants were “far less intelligent” than the “old” immigrants. (Quoted in Hatton and
Williamson 1998, chap.7).
21
No general conclusion can be drawn about the role of immigrants in supplying
entrepreneurial and other skills or about contributions to the growth of internal demand.
Positive representations are there in histories of Argentina and Uruguay. Immigrants did
supply businessmen for Mexico and Chile but either for Cuba or for Brazil can
immigration be credited for such an impact. Immigrants to Latin America from
Southern Europe were positively selected by literacy and they carried higher literacy
rates than native populations. On the whole, Latin America benefited clearly from
European immigration. This does not imply that European immigrants were the key
variable explaining economic growth before the 1930s. Those countries with the highest
immigration rate displayed fast economic growth but policy, institutional stability,
foreign capital and trade also played a crucial role.
Section III. Was immigration a demographic gift or a demographic
burden?
Immigrants who settled permanently in Latin America contributed to the growth
of the population over the long run. This was especially true for countries like
Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. In the 1880s almost 26 percent of total population
growth in Argentina was due to immigration. Over the next period, 1891-1910 the share
fell to14 percent and down to 9 percent in the 1920s. In 1901-1920 immigration was
responsible for only 7 percent of Brazilian population growth but in the years of high
immigration, 1891-1900, the share was a spectacular 30 percent.
Immigration affects the overall rate of population growth by increasing absolute
numbers and numbers of young people having children. It also has a direct impact on
the age structure of the population. Migration is a highly selective process by age. In the
short run, immigrants increase participation rates and contribute to the growth of the
labour force, but in the long run the age structure of the population changes as the
population grows. In recent years the debate on the influence of demography on
economic growth has shifted the emphasis from population size and growth to age
structures (Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2002). People’s economic behaviour varies at
different stages of their life cycles. Thus, changes in a country’s age structure can have
significant effects on economic performance. Economic growth and population growth
are related by modifications to the age structures of populations passing through
demographic transitions. Dividing the population in three age groups, two dependants
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(the young and the old) and one economically active, each age group in a population
exhibits different patterns of demand and savings. Children require intensive investment
in health and education, prime-age adults supply labour and savings, and the elderly
require expenditures upon health and retirement benefits (Coale and Hoover 1958,
Kelley 1988).
Did immigration into Latin America increase the working age group and thereby
produce a “demographic gift” for economic growth? Although policies to take
advantage of this “gift” have to be implemented, immigrants are “ready-to-use” working
population and lower the volume of resources devoted to the care of children. But
immigrants as young adults also increase the number of dependents since they have and
raise children in the host country hence creating a “demographic burden”. Thus, it is
important to measure the overall demographic effect of immigration in Latin America.
Immigrants contributed to the labour force growth and in the absence of
immigration labour costs would have been higher. O’Rourke and Williamson (1999)
have estimated that in 1910 real wages would have been 46 percent higher in Argentina
without immigration. The Brazilian case is not so advantageous. Real wages would
apparently have been only 2 percent higher in 1910 in the absence of mass migration. A
larger labour force only becomes a gain when extra workers find jobs. Since immigrants
left for Latin America because of the availability of jobs (and higher wages) we can
assume that, in the short run, the majority of immigrants of working age recorded in
population censuses in the receiving countries contributed to economic growth. Since
population as a whole grows more slowly than active population, output per capita
increased faster than output per worker.
Young permanent immigrants might also have raised birth rates and increased
dependency burdens. Did countries of immigration have higher birth rates because of
the arrival of young population? Or did immigrants contribute to an early start of the
demographic transition by lowering birth rates? Already in 1895 the average number of
children in Argentina was 8.4 for natives born and 6.1 for foreign born women, but
most of differences can be explained by location (urban or rural) and literacy levels. By
1947 figures were 3.6 children per native woman compared to 3.2 for foreign females
(Rechini de Lattes and Lattes 1975). Immigrants tend generally to converge to the
demographic patterns of the host society; in the Argentinean case both native and
foreign women seem to have converged to lower birth rates simultaneously. Populations
that experienced rapid rate of increase in per capita income generally have lower
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mortality and lower fertility than those where per capita income grew more slowly.
(1986) argued that the high birth rates of Latin America can be related to the large
shares of populations that remained rural and that only developed and open societies
had entered the first phase of the demographic transition by the first quarter of the
twentieth century. Demographic transition seems then more related to structural changes
than to the arrival of European immigrants.
In balance, immigrants contributed significantly to the growth of work forces. It
seems clear that Argentina, Uruguay and several in the New World, derived economic
advantage from immigration simply because the economically active population grew
faster than the dependant populations in the years between 1870 and 1913. However,
this positive contribution may have been offset by accelerated population growth over
the long run. For example, according to Taylor (1992;1994) high rates of immigration
and more fecund immigrants to Argentina compared to Australia increased the
dependent population group, depressed savings, inhibited capital deepening and
retarded economic growth. During the Belle Époque capital imports maintained the
level of output per worker but in the interwar years when foreign investment declined
Argentina suffered from low domestic savings capacity, a function of high dependency
burdens due to previous waves of pre-war immigration. The ratios of dependent
population (0-15 age group plus those older than 64) to active population, were already
higher in 1914 than dependency rates in Canada, Australia and the United States. In the
1940s those rates were however similar to those found in Canada but still higher than
Australian and the United States.
Table 4 presents dependency rates in Latin America both for massive
immigration countries and low immigration countries like Chile. In the late nineteenth
century, Cuba had the lowest dependency rates. Argentina and Chile, with very different
experiences with immigration had similar dependency rates, while Mexico and Uruguay
had the highest. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Argentina had the lowest
dependency rate attributable to the rapid increase of working age population due to
immigration. Brazilian immigration policy which favoured family arrivals could have
contributed to the rise in the dependency rate. But in Cuba, where immigration from
Europe was predominately male immigration with no children, native population
growth and perhaps the influx of Caribbean immigrants increased the dependency rate
notably. The Argentine tendency of decreasing the dependency rate is clear in 1947.
Even in the 1940s when the demographic transition was on its way in more Latin
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American countries that in the preceding period, Argentina clearly had the lowest
dependency rates of all.
Table 4
Dependency Rates: Latin America and other New World Countries (1872-1947)
Countries
Argentina 1869 1895 1914 1947
0.839 0.734 0.688 0.533
Brazil 1872 1890 1900 1920 1940
0.719 0.755 0.907 0.880 0.815
Cuba 1889 1907 1919 1943
0.643* 0.698* 0.891* 0.660
Uruguay 1900 1908
0.854* 0.777
Mexico 1895 1900 1910 1930 1940
0.813* 0.805* 0.801 0.802* 0.796
Chile 1895 1907 1920 1930
0.772 0.784* 0.702 0.685
Canada 1871 1891 1911 1921 1931 1941
0.883 0.692 0.600 0.645 0.598 0.526
Australia 1861 1891 1901 1911 1921 1933 1947
0.610 0.666 0.643 0.520 0.567 0.500 0.496
US 1870 1880 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940
0.754 0.686 0.632 0.547 0.573 0.533 0.488
*Age group (15-60)
The dependency rate is the ratio of dependent population (ages 0-15) + (over 64) to potentially active
population (ages 15-64)
Sources: Calculated from Mitchell (1993) and (1983)
The idea of the demographic burden in Argentina depends entirely on the basis
of the comparison. Within Latin America Argentina and Uruguay, the highest recipients
of Southern European immigrants, had the lowest dependency rates since the beginning
of the twentieth century. Several forces (other than immigration) appeared to raise
burdens of dependency in Latin America.
A new research agenda: the role of social capital
A new research agenda should include new problems and hypotheses.
Immigrants not only affected population and workforce growth; they also contributed to
the creation of social capital correlated by economists with good economic performance
(Dasgupta and Serageldin 1999). There is an abundant literature on the associations and
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societies created by immigrants in the host countries. The concept of social capital,
based on trust, cooperation and shared civic values can be very usefully applied to the
role immigrants played in associational activities in several Latin American countries.
Cultural affinity also makes a contribution to the creation of social capital. Southern
Europeans in Latin America had a cultural capital with includes language, manners,
religion and values which were readily accepted in the host countries. Immigrants
certainly contributed to the creation and operation of associations and cooperative
organizations in several Latin American countries. They formed mutual aid societies,
published newspapers, joined clubs and churches and founded various associations.
Particularly the Italians have received a preferential attention (Baily 1999, Devoto and
Fernandez 1988 and Devoto 1984, among others). High levels of social capital have
been found in Northern Italy compared to the south. Since social capital is assumed to
be transferable it might be that Latin American countries received not only more literate
and skilled Italian immigrants than the United States but also immigrants with the
ability to create social capital. Argentina received the largest inflow of Northern Italians
thus importing social capital from Europe. Italians in Latin America might have
succeeded precisely because they had higher levels of social capital than the native
population or other immigrants groups.
The value and uses of social capital depend on the institutional environment and
it might be the case that Argentina had an exceptional institutional environment for the
development of immigrants’ social capital abilities compared to other Latin American
countries. Both Baily (1999) and Moya (1998) ponder the importance of the social and
institutional networks that facilitated the insertion of Italians and Spaniards into
Argentine society. High levels of social capital have also been associated with high
levels of human capital. It could be the case that public commitment to education in
different countries was also influenced by the stock of social capital. Electoral
participation also provides a key measure of social capital for a given country.
Immigrants’ associations have always been studied from the point of view of the
immigrant communities. The majority of the research done has concentrated on the
internal life of the association, ruling members and their connections with local
authorities and, above all, the efforts made to preserve the roots with the communities
of origin. Nothing has been said about whether some associations were created by
natives in the host country as a reaction to the immigrant flow. Since social capital
describes circumstances in which individuals can use membership in groups and
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networks to secure benefits (economic or not) historians who had worked on
immigrants networks and associations can contrast some of the existing theories about
cooperative arrangements and social capital. For example, it is well known that mutual
aid societies were attractive for the insurance benefits that they offered to their members
and, by extension, to their families. These organizations often offered selective benefits
to members like life insurances, hospital assistance, free medical care or widowers and
orphans support. Opportunities for trust and fellowship were, however, important by-
products of the need for economic security. This important avenue of research regarding
mutual aid societies is still waiting for Latin American countries (For the US see Gamm
and Putnam 2001). Social capital analysis can definitely contribute to the revival of
immigrants’ associational life studies from the dead end it seems to be in the last years
and can shed new light on the contribution of immigration to economic development in
the long run from a new perspective.
This paper surveys Latin America immigration experience since the late
nineteenth century to 1930. It assesses inferences about European migrants in Latin
America derived from the experience of migrants in the United States and questions its
validity.
The global economy evolved slowly through the nineteenth century. Voluntary
migration flows reached their highest levels in the early decades of the twentieth
century. Latin American countries like Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba and Brazil
participated actively in the international labour market. Several other countries in the
region, remained, however, outside this market.
The experiences of Latin American countries are not fully incorporated into
current debates on the cost and benefits from Atlantic migration despite the fact that 13
million of Europeans migrated to that region between 1870 and 1930. Latin America
was a late comer to the age of mass migration. Migratory flows only became really
large and significant in the early years of the twentieth century prior to World War One
and the international labour market changed dramatically after the War. When mass
European immigration to Latin America started in the 1880s, it was clear that the region
could not compete with the United States.
European immigration to Latin America from the 1880s onwards presents us
with similar patterns to those of other parts of the Americas and Australia. The same
economic and demographic forces operated between sending and receiving regions in
the Latin American segment of the international labour market. Immigrants to Latin
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America also came from latecomer countries to emigration from Europe and were in
several respects different from those who crossed the Atlantic in early phases of the
movement. On balance, Latin America received poorer and potentially less productive
immigrants than the United States simply because the dominant stream emigrating from
Europe over the years 1880-1914 came from the economically backward areas of
Southern and Eastern Europe. But these migrants arrived also to the United States. Yet
their adjustment to the host labour markets in Latin America seems to have been quite
successful particularly in urban sectors but future analysis will wish to distinguish
between first and second generation of immigrants. Furthermore qualifications can be
made about the prevailing representation of immigrants in Latin America as unskilled,
illiterate and low productive labour. Immigrants made rational choices of where to go.
They went to places where their handicaps (in language, education and literacy) would
be minimized because demands for unskilled labour were high. Lacking of specific
skills may have been an advantage in the adaptation process to new urban labour
markets. Rates of literacy were certainly lower among Latin American immigrants than
Northern European emigrants going to the United States, Canada and Australia, but
very similar to the overall flow of Southern and Eastern Europeans. In Latin America
migrants were positively selected from their countries of origin, particularly in the
Iberian Peninsula, according to literacy. Further more, immigrants had higher literacy
rates than the native populations of Latin America and countries with the smallest native
population around 1870 and the largest inflow of European immigrants, showed the
highest literacy rates around 1910.
Immigration had an impact on labour force and population growth. Migrants
raised the dependent age groups in the population, particularly children, in the medium
and long run. Since the debate on the influence of demography on economic growth has
shifted the emphasis from population size and growth to the economic consequences of
the age structure of the population, the long run impact of large numbers of young
immigrants to Latin American countries, other than Argentina, waits for a promising
research.
Migration history is clearly biased in favour of the United States. It is dominated
by a narrow conception of the “Atlantic Economy” and when dealing with Latin
America is still full of over-simplifications. This paper has aimed to qualify some of the
traditional representations. To consider migrants other than the Europeans should be the
next step in the global history of migration in Latin America.
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1 The distinction between free and coerced labour is important here since Latin America was one of the
major participants in the Atlantic slave trade. Klein (1999), Eltis (1983)
2 I am grateful to Tim Dore for this reference and to Bruce Sacerdote for allowing me to use his
unpublished data.
3 It should be bear in mind that Spanish data refers to prices from Galician ports. The trip from the Canary
Islands to Cuba was cheaper.
4 See the special issue of the Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Geselleschaft
Lateinamerikas, 13 (1976)
5 Going back to the Dillingham Commission in the USA, the general belief of the low quality of
immigrants from Southern Europe has been repeated in almost all general accounts of transatlantic
migration.
6 That is why research with nominative data, as Moya (1998) for the city of Buenos Aires, proved so
useful.
7 Urbanizations rates were 27, 12 and 17 percent in Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively
8 For example, the high proportion of Spanish-born bank clerks in Cuba in 1907 (57 percent) reflects the
weight of the Spanish banks in the island years before the Independence (Maluquer de Motes 1992).
9 Data refers to immigrants over 14 years of age. US Immigration Commission, vol. III, table 15, 1907-
1910
10 Data might also reflect the general upward trend in Spanish literacy in the 1920s.
